Unfulfilled hopes "Space Shuttle"

I had planned?

Why is this so?

   The idea of a reusable space vehicles occupied the minds of scientists and engineers in the U.S. since the 50-ies. On the one hand, sorry to break the ground dropped the spent stage. On the other hand, a device that combines the properties of plane and space ship, will be in line with the plane of philosophy, where Menagarishvili natural. Born different projects: X-20 Dyna Soar, Recoverable Orbital Launch System (later Aerospaceplane). In the sixties this was largely invisible activity continued in the shadow of programs "Gemini" and "Apollo". In 1965, two years before flight "Saturn-V", was created the Subcommittee on technology reusable launch vehicles at the Coordination Council for air and space operations (involving the U.S. air force and NASA). The result of this work was a document published in 1966, which stated the need to overcome serious difficulties, but promised a bright future for work in earth orbit. The air force and NASA had a different vision of the system and different requirements, so instead of one of the project ideas were presented of ships of various configurations and degrees of Menagarishvili. After 1966 NASA began to think about creating a space station. This station was meant to deliver a large number of cargo into orbit, which, in turn, raised the issue of the cost of such delivery. In December of 1968 established a working group, which became involved in the so-called combined apparatus of the launch and landing of the Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle (ILRV). The report of this group was presented in July 1969 and claimed that ILRV should be able to:

To supply space station
To launch and return from orbit satellites
Orbit boosters and useful load
Orbit fuel (for the subsequent fueling of other vehicles)
To service and repair satellites in orbit
Conduct short manned mission

The report considered three classes of ships: reusable ship "riding" on the expendable launch vehicle, polytonality ship ("half" steps is tanks or engines that are reset in flight) and two-stage vehicle, both stages of which are reusable.
In parallel, in February 1969, President Nixon established a working group, whose task was the determination of the direction of movement in space exploration. The result of the work of this group was the recommendation to create a reusable spacecraft that could:
Become a fundamental improvement of existing space technology from the point of view of cost and volumes being launched into orbit
To transport people, cargo, fuel, other ships, boosters and stuff into orbit as the plane regularly, cheap, and often a lot. To be a universal for compatibility with a wide range of civil and military payloads.

Initially, the engineers moved in the direction of two-stage fully reusable system: a large winged manned spacecraft carried a small winged manned spacecraft, which entered orbit: This combination theoretically was the cheapest to operate. However, the requirement of a large payload made the system too large (and therefore expensive). Besides the military wanted the possibility of a horizontal maneuver in 3000 miles for landing at the Baikonur launch during the first cycle of a polar orbit that limited engineering solutions (for example, it became impossible straight wings). The final layout is very much dependent on the following requirements: the Size and capacity of the cargo Bay the Size of a horizontal maneuver Engines (type, thrust and other parameters), the Method of planting (on engines or planning) the materials Used In the summary of the hearings at the White House and Congress were adopted final requirements: Cargo Bay 4,5x18,2 m (15h60 feet) 30 tons into low earth orbit, 18 tons on a polar orbit, the Possibility of horizontal manoeuvre 2000 km In around 1970 it was found that on the space station and the Shuttle at the same time money is not enough. And station, for which the Shuttle was supposed to haul cargo, was cancelled. At the same time, in an engineering environment reigned unchecked optimism. Based on the operating experience of experimental rocket planes (X-15), engineers predicted a decrease in the cost of a kilogram into orbit by two orders of magnitude (one hundred times).

I had planned?

   At the Symposium dedicated to the program "space Shuttle", which was held in October 1969, "father" of the Shuttle George Mueller said, "Our goal is to reduce the cost of a kilogram into orbit with $2000 for the Saturn V to the level of $40-100 per kilogram. We will open a new era of space exploration. The task for future weeks and months for this Symposium, for the air force and NASA is providing the confidence that we can do it." For various options on the basis of the space Shuttle was expected to achieve cost excretion in the range of 90 to 330 dollars per kilogram. Moreover, it was assumed that "the space Shuttle" second generation will reduce these figures to 33-66 dollars per kilogram. According to the calculations of Mueller's launch of space Shuttle should cost $1-2. 5 million (compared to $185 million for the Saturn V). Also been conducted fairly serious economic calculations, which showed that in order to even be compared to the cost of the launch vehicle "Titan III" the direct comparison of prices without the discount, the Shuttle need to start 28 times a year. In fiscal 1971, President Nixon has allocated $125 million for the production of disposable launch vehicles, which accounted for 3.7% of the NASA budget. I.e., if the Shuttle was already in 1971, he would have saved only 3.7 percent of the NASA budget. Nuclear physicist Ralph Lapp decided that for the period 1964-1971 the Shuttle if already was, would have saved 2.9% of the budget. Of course, these figures could not protect the Shuttle, and NASA have embarked on a slippery slope of playing with numbers: "if there was built space station, and if she needed a supply mission every two weeks, then shuttles would save a billion dollars a year". Also promoted the idea of "with these capabilities, the start of the payload will be cheaper, and in greater numbers than now, that will increase savings". Only the combination of ideas "the Shuttle will fly often and save money on every start" and "new satellites for the Shuttle will be cheaper available for single missiles" could make the Shuttle cost-effective. In parallel, were complex political games with the participation of the companies-potential producers, the BBC, the government and NASA. For example, NASA lost to the office of management and budget Executive office of the President of USA battle for the boosters of the first stage. NASA wanted the boosters on the rocket engine, but due to the fact that the solid propellant boosters were cheaper in development, were selected last. The air force, which sought military manned missions with the X-20 and MOL, actually received military missions of the space Shuttle for free in exchange for political support for NASA. Manufacture of shuttles deliberately smudged across the country between different companies for the economic and political effect. In the end, these complex maneuvers, the contract for the development of the system "space Shuttle" was signed in the summer of 1972. The history of production and operation is beyond the scope of this article. What? Now, when the program is finished, it is possible with sufficient accuracy to tell which goals were achieved and which were not.

Targets achieved

Delivery of goods of various types (satellites, boosters, segments of the ISS).
The ability to repair satellites in low-earth orbit.
The ability of satellites return to Earth.
The ability to send a flight up to eight people.
Implemented Menagarishvili.
Implemented a new layout of the spacecraft.
The possibility of horizontal maneuver.
Large cargo Bay.
The cost and development time to meet the deadline promised by President Nixon in 1971.

Not achieved the goals and failures

Quality facilitation of access to space. Instead of reducing the price per kilogram is two orders of magnitude, "space Shuttle" has become one of the most expensive means of delivering satellites into orbit. Quick shuttles between flights. Instead of the expected two weeks between flights, shuttles were preparing to start for months. Before the disaster of the Challenger record between flights was 54 days, after the "Challenger" — 88 days. Over the years of operation of Shuttle buses, they run on average 4.5 times a year instead of the minimum allowable according to the calculations of 28 times per year. Easy maintenance. The technical solutions chosen were very time consuming to maintain. The main engines required a lot of dismantling and time in service. Turbopump units of the first model engines required a complete rebuilding or repair after each flight. The thermal protection tiles were unique in each nest were staged its own tile. All tiles 35 000, besides, they can be lost or damaged in flight. Replace all disposable media. Shuttle never launched on a polar orbit that is needed mainly for reconnaissance satellites. Conducted preparatory work, but they were stopped after the disaster of the Challenger. Reliable access to space. Four Orbiter meant that the Shuttle disaster is the loss of a quarter of the fleet. After the disaster, the flights were stopped for years. Also, shuttles were notorious permanent transfers launches. The payload capacity of the Shuttle was five tons below the required specs (instead of 30 24,4) Large horizontal maneuver has never been applied in reality due to the fact that the Shuttle was not flying on a polar orbit. Return satellites from orbit ceased in 1996. Orbit was returned only five satellites. Repair satellites also were not very popular. All were repaired five satellites (though Hubble was serviced five times). Adopted engineering solutions had a negative impact on system reliability. On takeoff and landing areas were out of the rescue of the crew in the accident. Because of this, killed the Challenger. Mission STS-9 almost ended in disaster because of the fire in the tail section, which has emerged on the runway. If this fire a minute earlier, the Shuttle would have fallen out of the rescue of the crew. The fact that the Shuttle has always flown manned, compromised by people without the need for routine satellite launch was a lack of automation. Due to the low intensity of the use of Shuttle buses will become obsolete sooner than physically. In 2011, "space Shuttle" was a very rare example of operation of the 80386 processor. Disposable media it was possible to gradually upgrade new series. The closure of the program "space Shuttle" is superimposed on the cancellation of the program "Constellation" that led to the loss of independent access to space for many years, image losses and need to buy space on space ships of another country. New management systems and ndelivery fairings are allowed to launch large satellites on disposable rockets. The Shuttle holds the sad record among space systems by the number of people killed.

The program "space Shuttle" gave US a unique opportunity to work in space, but from the point of view of difference "what you wanted — and received a" we have to conclude that it has not achieved its goals.

Why is this so?

Specially emphasize that at this point, I expressed my opinion, perhaps some of them are wrong.
Shuttles have been the result of many compromises between the interests of a few large organizations. Perhaps if there was one person or a team of like-minded people who had a clear vision of the system, it could get better. The requirement to "be everything to everyone" and replace all disposable rockets increased the cost and complexity of the system. Versatility when combining heterogeneous requirements complicate, expensive, unnecessary functionality and worse efficiency than specialization. Easily add alarm to mobile phone speaker, watches, buttons, and electronic components are already there. But a flying submarine will be more difficult more expensive and worse of specialized aircraft and submarines. The complexity and cost of the system grows exponentially with the size. Perhaps the Shuttle 5-10 tons payload (3-4 times less implemented) would have been more successful. They could build more ships in the fleet to make unmanned, to make a one-time module for increased payloads heavier rare missions. "Dizzy with success". Successful implementation of three programs consistently increasing complexity could turn the heads of engineers and managers. In fact, the first launch of a manned unmanned without testing that the lack of systems / crew during injection/descent talk about a confidence.